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Innovation and National Security
The Loss of Economic and Military Strength
Through the Theft of Ideas
Matthew D. Pedersen
From the earliest days of nation-states, measures of
power have been displayed by emphasizing the size and
superiority of military force. The 16th through the early
20th century saw the increasing size of armed forces as
the rest of the world began to appreciate the might and
strength of the Spanish Armada, the British Royal Navy,
the Imperial Japanese Navy, and the American Carrier
Battle Group. The expansion of naval forces allowed
countries to colonize lands, gather raw materials, and
assist in their global hegemony. Following the end of
World War II and the development of nuclear weapons,
a transformational shift grew out of the dependency to
have cutting edge military technology and the materials
to develop them. The strength of nations thus became tied
proportionately to the development of the military force’s
innovation as well as its size.
Military Innovation
Military planners were concerned to a lesser extent
with having the largest fighting force rather the most
adept at fighting the battles throughout the 20th and
21st centuries. For the military force of the latter
20th century, “the degree of national security rapidly
declines when reliance is placed on the quantity of
existing equipment instead of its quality.”123 While
the U.S. Air Force was the branch most concerned
with this during the nuclear era of development, that
quote is universal to all branches of the military in that
“[t]he first essential of air power [or any other power]
necessary for peace and security is pre-eminence in
research.”124 The advanced research & development
(R&D) that had grown out of the Manhattan
Project and the shared mutual-interdependence
of uniting civilian and military personnel had
historically been overseen by military command.
By 1950, military R&D contracts numbered nearly
123 Mahnken, Thomas G. Technology and the American Way of War Since
1945. (Columbia University Press, 04 July 2008), 31.

124 Ibid, 31.

20,000.125 Although the numbers will have grown
since the 1950s, estimates placed military R&D
costs in the neighborhood of $600 million. That
amounts to nearly one cent of every dollar paid
in federal taxes being spent for research towards
more effective weapons, equipment, medicines, and
utilization of human resources in war.126
Civilian Innovation
Yet now, more than in any previous period,
research and innovation is fostered under private
control. Historically, military officers held an
advantage over their civilian counterparts when it
came to thinking through the dilemmas of warfare;
however, the development of nuclear weapons
leveled the playing field.127 The technical superiority
that is pursued in research universities, private
research labs, and by individual entrepreneurs has
most recently coexisted alongside R&D currently
undertaken in Federal agencies such as the United
States’ Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) and its northern neighbor, Defense
Research and Development Canada (DRDC). While
government agencies’ progress is delayed due to the
red tape of governmental bureaucracies, their civilian
counterparts are able to efficiently bring new products
to market because of the demand to gain a market
advantage. Many programs receiving federal funds
have numerous officials and politicians with a say in
the matter that may have their own agenda or wish
to impose specific requirements relevant to their
department or their county.
This is best described by analogy: while something
like a horse may have been originally conceptualized,
specialized in purpose and required only to run quickly,
the end product after oversight and bureaucracy may
turn out to be something that resembles a camel; an
odd creature fairly adequate at doing multiple generic
tasks or responsibilities. The independence then of
the military from the civilian sphere was defunct and
the cohesion of the government, military, and private
125 Gellhorn, Walter. Security, Loyalty, and Science. (Ithaca, New York:
Cornell University Press, 1950), 1-2.

126 Mahnken, 31.
127 Ibid, 26.
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sector would then become essential to promoting
national security. Nations leading up to the early
20th century were all too eager to flex their military
muscles, yet the period following World War II to the
present showed the necessity of emphasis and reliance
on economic superiority as much as military strength.
Growth + R&D
A nation’s ability to grow its economy soon became
strategic to military planning. This was established
predominantly through innovation, as well as the ease
of which factors of production were accumulated,
specifically raw materials. The Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
determined that “innovation has long been recognized
as a main driver of economic growth, through the
development and exploitation of ideas for new
products and processes.”128
For growth to truly be fueled by R&D, protected
intellectual property (“IP”) rights are an essential
element to allow individuals, companies, and countries
to utilize the worthwhile investment to formulate
and apply a new idea. Without adequate protection
of these intellectual property rights, the incentive to
develop new ideas and products would be reduced,
thereby weakening the innovation process.129 The risks
of doing R&D become unfeasible when the costs to
develop exceed the benefit of the new product, or
when the security measure designed to protect IP
slows development or comes to a standstill. Gelhorn,
the university professor Emeritus at Columbia, wrote
that the United States was purchasing security during
the Cold War, but only at the expense of progress.
He maintains that a secret program’s nature of
apprehensiveness and compartmentalization hinders
the forward progress of scientific energies into the
unexplored areas.130 He details an example at Los
Alamos in the 1950s where Security Services personnel

128

“The Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and Piracy.” Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry. June 2008. http://www.oecd.
org/document/4/0,3746,en_2649_34173_40876868_1_1_1_1,00.html,
(accessed 10 March 2012).

129 “The Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and Piracy.”
130 Gellhorn, 4.

far outnumbered the scientists at the location.131
Yet according to the National Counter-Intelligence
Executive, Robert “Bear” Bryant, the R&D of both
public and private sectors is estimated at $400 billion
annually.14
Information Technology
The contest to develop and bring to market the
newest innovation or idea requires a centralized
hub for engineers, consultants, and designers to
amalgamate their separate work. The race begun in
the 1940s to collect radioactive material for nuclear
weapons and civil electricity also brought about
changes to electronics and computational theory;
their byproducts, the microprocessor and computer,
would revolutionize the way wars are fought and how
money is made.
Information technology (IT), and the way in
which information is stored and distributed, emerged
as a way to allow more involvement from more
individuals in different locations. A theory developed
from computer usage, and argued during the early
1990s, was the idea of the interrelatedness between
the military and the economy. The main tenets of
the concept known as network-centric warfare was
that information technology had revolutionized and
had fundamentally changed both war and business
through its interconnected nature.132 As Admiral
Arthur Cebrowski stated, “nations make war the same
way they make wealth.” Just as success in business
depends on the ability to circulate information, the
same is true of militaries; the victorious army is the
one which obtains and properly applies the most
accurate information.133
Espionage
With the digitization of theories and ease of
developing complex ideas, innovation and economic
growth have exponentially increased. The development
of the computers and the networks to connect them
131 Ibid, 3.
132 Herspring, Dale. Rumsfeld’s Wars: The Arrogance of Power. (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 30 April 2008), 26.

133 Ibid.
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has eased the flow of information. Unfortunately, as
exponential as the growth in ideas and innovation has
been, likewise has the relative ease for those ideas and
innovations to be acquired and exploited by forces
external to the R&D, and implementation of such ideas.
The responsibility for the theft of innovation falls equally
on the transfer of R&D from military institutions to
civilian and private agencies, as well as the ease with
which information is transferred in modern times.
Typically, a company’s main core competency
is tied to an innovative product, process, or service
that is protected by patents; yet, unscrupulous agents
find little moral quandary in the theft of an idea. In
a speech to the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, Bryant stated:

available to players interested in subverting national
security. According to The Economist, “the threat
is complex, multifaceted and potentially very
dangerous. Modern societies are ever more reliant
on computer systems linked to the Internet, giving
enemies more avenues of attack.”136 Unfortunately,
the threats are real and growing at an immeasurable
rate. The information being stolen requires vigilance
to defend as a critical national asset, and that in itself
makes it worthwhile to protect. According to Bryant,
“What I see as an economic espionage, to a large
extent, is really kind of a death by a thousand cuts.
And these are being perpetrated by different actors –
sometimes foreign intelligence services, sometimes by
corporations, sometimes by individuals.”

Today I would say the primary assets of corporate
Theft of Ideas
idea are intangible assets – certainly research and
development, certainly plans and business plans,
The threat to the United States and its way of
and really positions on contracts. The threat to the life, prosperity, and security is based in attacks by
U.S. private sector is more exposed and vulnerable foreign entities on a regular basis as they attempt
than ever.134
to steal not just America’s products or ideas, but its
livelihood. The theft occurs in nearly every sphere as
The threat to national security and the diffusion of military and civilian targets are not distinguishable as
technologies through theft by hostile actors becomes foreign entities seek to draw out every last shred of
dangerous partially through the ever-increasing information that is crucial to America. According to
influence that globalization has on the West, in the Office of National Counter-Intelligence Executive
addition to the sheer quantity of occurring theft. report on stolen U.S. economic secrets, the categories
While traditional human intelligence (HUMINT) of significant interest to foreign entities are:137
sources have historically been the most utilized
form of intelligence acquisition, the 21st century has
• information and communications technology
witnessed the explosion of electronic intelligence
- forms the backbone of nearly every other
(ELINT), cyber-espionage, and cyber-warfare.
technology
The reality and scale of cyber threats both to U.S.
• business information
national security and the economy has now been
- could pertain to supplies of scarce natural
realized, prompting the Pentagon to build complex
resources or provide foreign actors an edge
defenses around military networks and create the
in negotiations with U.S. businesses or the
new U.S. Cyber Command to integrate cyber
U.S. government
135
defense with operations across the military.
• military technologies
However, there are still vast unprotected arenas
- marine systems, UAVs, and other aerospace/
aeronautic technologies in particular
134 Robert Bear Bryant to Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The
Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection, ODNI Public Affairs.
136 “The Threat from the Internet: Cyber War.” The Economist. 01
03 November 2011. http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/
EconEsp_PressConf.pdf, (accessed 10 March 2012).

135 Lynn, William J., III. “Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon’s Cyber-

strategy”. Foreign Affairs. 01 September 2010. http://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/66552/william-j-lynn-iii/defending-a-new-domain, (accessed
03 April, 2012).

• civilian and dual-use technologies
China, through its sheer number of possible
- especially in sectors likely to experience fast recruits, exploits the population base by employing its
growth, such as clean energy and healthcare/ trademark human-wave/mosaic intelligence gathering
pharmaceuticals
sources to gather IP and foreign technologies. The
gathering of intelligence through open source
Furthermore, a 2007 report to Congress notes:
channels and the collection of many small pieces of
intelligence that have significance only when put
Foreign collectors attempted to obtain information together with the rest of the pieces is a daunting chore.
and technologies from each of the 20 categories While not exclusive to China, it is capable only by
on the Developing Sciences and Technologies List a country with a large network of analysts available.
(DSTL). The DSTL is a compendium of scientific Although it is a tedious task, it indicates their patience
and technological capabilities being developed in applying the notion implemented under Chairman
worldwide that have the potential to significantly Mao known as “Guanxi;” the development of personal
enhance or degrade US military capabilities in networks used to gain favors.139 These networks utilize
the future.138
Chinese migrants in the West to obtain technological
and economic intelligence that is crucial to its national
The theft of American IP that has escalated in the development.140 The reliance on Chinese nationals for
21st century occurs through illegal use of HUMINT intelligence gathering and implementation of Guanxi
gathering as well as the marginally less ominous open- networks shows the distrust toward foreigners; the
source Competitive Intelligence Solution (CIS), an Chinese Ministry for State Security (MSS) traditionally
extension of Business Market Analysis. By using gathers intelligence through ethnic Chinese only.141
legal loopholes, foreign entities are able to utilize
CIS and acquisitions of American enterprises to
retain the company’s IP and optimize it for their own
139 “Special Report: Espionage with Chinese Characteristics”. Stratfor. 24
domestic purposes.
March 2010. http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100314_intelligence_services_espionage_chinese_characteristics?page=15&width=480&inline=tr
ue, (accessed 03 April 2012).

138 Ibid.

140 Ibid.
141 Ibid.

July 2010. http://www.economist.com/node/16481504?story_
id=16481504&source=features_box1, (accessed 03 April 2012).

137 Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets in Cyberspace. Report to

Congress. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive. October
2011. http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/Foreign_Economic_Collection_2011.pdf, (accessed 03 April 2012).
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Agents gather technical intelligence in three primary
ways: 142
1)

Chinese nationals are asked to acquire
targeted technologies while traveling

2)

Foreign companies with the desired
technologies are purchased by Chinese
firms

3)

Equipment with the desired technologies
is purchased by Chinese front companies,
usually in Hong Kong

The first method utilizing travelers, students,
and student exchange programs, such as the Chinese
Association of Scientists and Engineers in Japan
(CASAJ) and the Association of Chinese Scientists
and Engineers in Japan (ACSEJ), gains access to
legally acquire knowledge on foreign technologies.
The ACSEJ’s stated purpose is “to promote and
strengthen cooperation and exchanges between
Chinese scientists and engineers in Japan and between
relevant organizations, institutions, and scholars in
China and other countries, especially Japan.”143 Its
bylaws note the manner in which these goals are
to be met, including “helping form PRC Science
&Technology (S&T) policy and supporting China’s
development of new high technology.”144
In 2011, James Dyson, inventor of the bagless
vacuum cleaner, warned that Chinese students were
stealing technological and scientific secrets from UK
universities.145 He also noted that Chinese students
were planting malware that would relay information
to China even after their departure from the
university.146
The mimicry of espionage methods should come

as no surprise, as China’s manner of espionage has
been emulated by South Korea’s Ministry of Science
and Technology (MOST) which is said to have
quadrupled its support for “informal” acquisition of
foreign technology; read espionage.147 According to
ROK news reports, part of the spending will be directed
towards a consolidated brainpool administered by
Seoul to recruit foreign scientists.148 MOST planned
on using the program to solve domestic technological
bottlenecks and to absorb advances and technological
knowledge. As part of the spending increase, Seoul
hosts a triennial event that attracts domestic and
overseas Korean scientists for the purpose of sharing
new scientific and technological information.
Ethnic Koreans numbering 291 and hailing from 12
countries were said to have been in attendance. The
event’s theme was described as contributing to South
Korea’s competitiveness through the globalization of
science and technology.149
The second method of foreign technology
procurement is through the acquisition of foreign
companies. China National Aero-Technology Import
& Export Corporation (CATIC) purchased the
American defense firm Mamco Manufacturing in the
1990s, despite a direct connection between CATIC
and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).150 An inside
source noted that Chinese companies such as Huawei
Technologies withdrew a bid to purchase 3Com,
a U.S. Internet and networking company, after an
investigation found links to China’s intelligence
services.151 In 2008, Huawei established a joint venture
with the U.S. anti-virus software company Symantec,
headquartered in Chengdu, China. Currently, it only
offers software in China, but Stratfor sources suggest
that if Huawei were to be used for Chinese intelligence,
it could easily insert spyware into computer systems
which subscribe to its service.152 As a backdrop to this

142 Ibid.
143 “Chinese Science and Technology Supported in Japan”. Office of the

147 “South Korea: Large Boost in Funds For Technology Transfer.” Office of

144 Ibid.
145 “Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage Reports”. Office

148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
150 “Special Report: Espionage with Chinese Characteristics.” Stratfor. 24

146 Ibid.

151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.

National Counterintelligence Executive. March 2003. http://www.ncix.gov/
docs/CHINESE_SUPPORT_GROUPS_JAPAN.pdf, (accessed 03 April
2012).

of the National Counterintelligence Executive. October 2011. http://www.
ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/index.php, (accessed 03 April
2012).

the National Counterintelligence Executive. March 2003. http://www.ncix.
gov/docs/SKoreaBoostsFundsForTechTransfer.pdf, (accessed 03 April
2012).

March 2010.
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consideration, it is relevant to note that Huawei was
founded in 1988 by Ren Zhengfei, a mere four years
after retirement from the Chinese military where he
finished his career as deputy director of the Science
Research Institute of the Engineering Army Corps.153
The third method of acquiring foreign
technologies, although technically legal in most
instances, occurs when Chinese companies and stateowned enterprises (SOE) purchase products with
technologies requested to further grow Chinese S&T
policies. One of the largest targeted industries is
aviation, publicized by a case that involved a Chinese
individual who was arrested for attempting to purchase
aerospace-related microchips from BAE Systems; this
is one of the companies involved in the development
of the Lockheed-Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.154
Similar espionage may have played a role in China’s
development of the new J-20 fifth-generation fighter,
yet that remains mere conjecture.155 Other speculation
abounds in China’s aviation industry, where it was
alleged that they purchased the remains of Israel’s
IAI Lavi and reverse-engineered it into the Chengdu
J-10 Fighter.156 Although there is still debate as to
the legitimacy of these claims, Russian engineers
claimed to have knowledge of China’s possession of
the Lavi, although the authenticity of those claims
remains contested.157
Concerns about the theft of aviation technology
are also shared by Russia.158 An arrangement was
in place for China to acquire 200 Sukhoi SU-27
Fighters, but China canceled the order early after
reverse-engineering Russian avionics and electronics.
China has recently revealed a version of Russia’s Al31F engine that they have produced domestically,
153 Engleman, Eric, “Huawei, ZTE Face Scrutiny From U.S. House Intel-

ligence Panel.” Bloomberg. 18 November 2011. http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2011-11-17/house-intelligence-panel-probing-chinese-phonecompanies-in-u-s-.html, (accessed 03 April 2012).

154 Noonan, Sean. “Chinese Espionage and French Trade Secrets.” Strat-

for. 20 January 2011. http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110119-chineseespionage-and-french-trade-secrets, (accessed 03 April 2012).

155 Ibid.
156 Hewson, Robert. “Chinese J-10 ‘Benefited from the Lavi Project’”. IHS.19

May 2008. http://www.janes.com/products/janes/defence-security-report.
aspx?id=1065926403, (accessed 03 April 2012).

157 Ibid.
158 Johnson, Reuben F. “Russian Industry Wary of Su-35 Sale to China.”

IHS. 16 March 2012. http://www.janes.com/products/janes/defencesecurity-report.aspx?ID=1065966179&channel=defence&subChannel=a
ir, (accessed 03 April 2012).

comparable in both technology and performance.
The Third Bureau of the MSS is responsible
for purchasing targeted technologies through shell
and front companies.159 Most of these businesses
are run independently of overt Chinese intelligence
management, though their leadership frequently
includes individuals who maintain connections with
intelligence officers, as previously noted in Guanxi
personal networks. One recent case involved the 88
Queensway Group, named for the address of an office
building in central Hong Kong that houses many
state-owned Chinese companies, along with the China
Investment Corporation, the country’s sovereign
wealth fund, and various private firms.160 A U.S.
Congressional report shows a possible link between
the building and “China’s intelligence apparatus.”161
One of the most recent and brazen espionage
cases conducted by China involves American
Superconductor Corp (AMSC), a computer systems
developer that serves as the electronic brains of wind
turbines, being sold to a Chinese turbine manufacturer
called Sinovel Wind Group Company. AMSC’s
technicians were unable to get turbines to follow
system commands and it was not until they consulted
with their software department that they realized
the Sinovel turbine was running a stolen version of
AMSC’s software. The Beijing-based manufacturer
was utilizing AMSC’s proprietary source code, and
thus with no further need for AMSC, they terminated
their agreement.162
Even worse for American national security is that
amongst Sinovel’s investors is a private equity group
founded by Wen Yunsong, son of China’s Premier,
Wen Jiabao.163 Shortly after the termination of the
agreement, Sinoval’s Chairman and President Han
Junliang helped create Dalian Guotong Electric,
159 “Special Report: Espionage with Chinese Characteristics.” Stratfor. 24
March 2010.

160 Levkowitz, Lee, Marta McLellan Ross, and J.R. Warner. “The 88 Queensway Group: A Case Study in Chinese Investors’ Operations in Angola
and Beyond,” U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission. 10
July 2009. http://www.uscc.gov/The_88_Queensway_Group.pdf, (accessed 03 April 2012), 33-35.

161 Ibid.
162 Riley, Michael A. and Ashlee Vance. “China Corporate Espionage Boom

Knocks Wind Out of U.S. Companies.” Bloomberg. 15 March 2012. http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-15/china-corporate-espionageboom-knocks-wind-out-of-u-s-companies.html, (accessed 03 April 2012).

163 Ibid.
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making himself chairman and granting Sinovel a 20
percent stake.164 After opening up a second Sinovel
turbine, AMSC investigators noted that an AMSC
power converter had been swapped for a Guotongmanufactured duplicate.165
Although most countries that seek American IP and
technology have dedicated HUMINT organizations,
China is the exception. Nearly 70 percent of Chinese
intelligence operations are not directly conducted
by Chinese intelligence services such as the MSS,
MPS, or MID.166 Most open source intelligence is
gathered by a wide array of civil Chinese institutions
that are only marginally distanced from the PLA. An
example of a civilian agency performing espionage for
China’s S&T is the State Administration for Science,
Technology and Industry for National Defense
(SASTIND). Although administrated separately from
the PLA, it indirectly makes recommendations to the
Central Military Commission (CMC) for research
and planning in technological military development,
functionally akin to DARPA in the United States.167

The necessity of gathering intelligence from
multiple sources and implement the acquired
knowledge is a race amongst nations. Mikhail
Fradkov, a former Deputy Minister for Foreign
Economic Relations and the current director of
Russian foreign intelligence, explains that intelligence
“aims at supporting the process of modernization of
our country and creating the optimal conditions for
the development of its science and technology.”168

on acquiring American ideas. Though HUMINT
sources and shell corporations have historically
been prominent tools, the emergence of computer
networking and the vast globalization of business
have made the U.S. even more susceptible to threats
from multiple sources. The vast wasteland of the
Internet, devoid of market forces or global policing
to control it, has proven to be a complicated border
to seal, and the extent of damage done to America’s
progress is difficult to calculate. Some cases exist where
HUMINT sources leak technology intentionally and
electronically such as the theft of B-1B technology
at Rockwell which was sold to the Chinese aviation
industry by a Chinese engineer.169
Yet, most of the espionage of the 21st century will
be through electronic and cyber means. Cyber-attacks
can come through multiple avenues, as many of the
most recent and blatant incursions have revealed.
These penetrations are miniscule in perspective
to the quantity of successful incursions. Recently
reported events in the media, such as the keylogging
of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Unmanned
Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) flown from Creech
Air Force Base in Nevada, may not directly be the
theft of technology or ideas, yet they show the modus
operandi (MO) and operational procedures of U.S.
proprietary technology.170 Vulnerabilities are noted as
in the case of Iraqi insurgents gaining multiple days
of footage of UAVs and UCAVs operating in Iraq.
Foreign entities can take advantage of the unencrypted
streaming video and design systems to operate in the
same manner as the United States unmanned vehicle
program.171

Malware

USB Peripherals

Transition to ELINT

The multitude of channels used by foreign nations
The keylogging program embedded and running
to conduct espionage on the United States, legal or in the background of Creech AFB’s private and secure
otherwise, shows the dedication and priority placed network was perpetrated with one of the cheapest
and most commonly used computer peripheral.172
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid.
166 “Special Report: Espionage with Chinese Characteristics.” Stratfor. 24
March 2010.

167 Ibid.
168 “Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets in Cyberspace.” October
2011.

169 Ibid.
170 Shachtman, Noah. “Exclusive: Computer Virus Hits U.S. Drone Fleet.”

Wired. 07 October 2011. http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/
virus-hits-drone-fleet/, (accessed 03 April 2012).

171 Ibid.
172 Ibid.
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External USB drives are available for less than $10,
yet their potential as a vehicle to deliver malware is
increasing as the seemingly innocuous device can have
malware code embedded. Left in the open or mailed
to a recipient as a gift, as soon as they are plugged into
a port they can then infect the entire network, which
up until that point may have been private and secure.
The Creech AFB case is just one of many
documented accounts. A 2008 DOD report of a
U.S. military installation in the Middle East details
the breaching of the base due to a USB drive and the
transfer of data to a server under foreign control.173
One of the greatest issues with the use of devices
manufactured overseas such as USB drives, or any
such peripheral, is that the manufacture of computer
chips and hardware for Western companies and
governments could come from the factory loaded
with malware, and that most USB drives are already
infected before they leave the factory.174 The Pentagon
has recently banned the use of USB drives due to the
unknown nature of foreign factories and the countries
in which they are located.175
Network Intrusions and Anti-Virus
The extent to which foreign nations use the
interconnected nature of computers to steal technology
has forced companies and governments to maintain
stringent operational standards in order to sustain
the privacy and security of their networks. Examples
of this include the Stuxnet and Shadyrat viruses;
two documented cases of intrusions into networks
too complex to have been perpetrated by criminal
organizations and appear to have links to intelligence
organizations.176 Incidents such as Operation Shady
Rat and the use of remote access tools to commandeer
computers of particular Asian countries were said to

have lasted longer than two years.177
For data protection managers, the most chilling
element in malware and cyber attacks is the complicity
of some anti-virus manufacturers. A conflict of interest
arises where there have been links forged between
anti-virus companies and foreign intelligence services.
Huawei, the aforementioned telecommunications
company which attempted to purchase the U.S.based 3Com, has established a joint venture with
the U.S. anti-virus manufacturer Symantec. The
partnership has obvious conflicts of interest as
much of the malware and bots in distribution have
some connection with advancing China’s needs in
technology and intelligence gathering.178
Telecommunications Breach
Another espionage method has been the subversion
of telecommunications networks, both domestically
and in foreign countries. Most reported cases of
incursions are through IP rerouting, fraudulent secure
socket layers (SSLs), and physical phone tampering.
Reuters reported that in 2010, Internet traffic was
rerouted through a foreign server controlled by a
state-owned enterprise (SOE).179 The hijacked IP
belonged to the U.S. government and military sites
including the DOD, the armed forces, and a few
select commercial websites.180 Intelligence services
also note that digital certificates (falsely) confirming
the legitimacy of websites and fraudulently-issued
SSLs have been issued in order to allow foreign
countries to send and receive transmissions to lure
unsuspecting individuals to compromise passwords
or disclose confidential trade secrets.181
Foreign countries are also utilizing travel and
business to compromise international trade secrets.
177 Finkle, Jim. “Q+A-Massive cyber attack dubbed ‘Operation Shady RAT.’”
Reuters. 03 August 2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/03/
cyberattacks-idUSN1E76R22Q20110803, (accessed 03 April 2012).

173 Lynn, William J. III, “Defending A New Domain.” 01 September 2010.
174 “Pushing Ahead of the Cyberwarfare Pack.” Stratfor. 02 March 2009.

http://www.uspoliticsonline.net/science-technology/51078-chinas-cyberwar-against-world.html, (accessed 03 April 2012).

175 Ibid.
176 “Building A Cyber Secure Plant.” Siemens Totally Integrated Automation.

30 September 2010. http://www.totallyintegratedautomation.com/2010/09/
building-a-cyber-secure-plant/, (accessed 03 April 2012).

178 “Pushing Ahead of the Cyberwarfare Pack.” Stratfor. 02 March 2009.
179 Wolf, Jim. “Pentagon Says “Aware” of China Internet Rerouting.”

Reuters. 19 November 2010. http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/19/
us-cyber-china-pentagon-idUSTRE6AI4HJ20101119, (accessed 03 April
2012).

180 Ibid.
181 Keizer, Gregg. “Hackers Steal SSL Certificates for CIA, MI6, Mossad.”

Computer World. 4 September 2011. http://www.computerworld.com/s/
article/9219727/Hackers_steal_SSL_certificates_for_CIA_MI6_Mossad,
(accessed 03 April 2012).
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There are reported cases of China’s Public Security
Bureau (PSB, the Chinese equivalent of the FBI)
going to Western hotel chains in China during the
2008 Olympics, with assertions that they had to
install “special internet monitoring devices” that
would give the PSB unprecedented access to foreign
communications, and potentially even foreign
trade secrets.182
The threat to American innovation is a direct
challenge to American prosperity according to
Jeffrey Goldberg of Bloomberg News; advanced
American technological innovations are “the
physical manifestation of American ingenuity and
confidence.”183 The perpetrators of the theft that
affects American prosperity are wide ranging, but
most actors fall into three categories: state actors,
non-state actors, and quasi-state actors.

to strategic Chinese interests in a variety of countries,
including:184
      • Angola
• Bermuda
• Cote d’Ivoire
• Israel
• Nigeria
• Portugal
• Singapore
• United States

• Argentina
• Congo
• Indonesia
• Mozambique
• North Korea
• Russia
• Tanzania
• Venezuela

88 Queensway Group appears to have connections
with Chinese State Security; however, many
corporations acquire foreign technology through
illegitimate means with no national security initiative
and are focused solely on industrial espionage.185
Preferred companies to be targeted are often wellState Actors
regarded global producers such as: Ford, Valspar,
Rockwell, GM, Boeing, BAE Systems, DuPont,
State actors such as state intelligence agencies have Dow Chemical, Google, Apple, Lockheed Martin,
historically been the largest parties concerned with Microsoft, and most recently, Renault.
the theft of military technology, yet the dependence
on economic strength and the hoarding of raw
Quasi-State Actors
materials have become a larger priority of national
security. Countries have employed Competitive
The final actors involved in intellectual property
Intelligence Solution (CIS) to obtain open source theft are the individuals and small organizations
information in addition to utilizing spy agencies to which exploit industrial espionage for personal
gather intelligence. Yet, the foreign policy nightmare gain and concealed motives. While nations and
of getting caught operating in a foreign area has companies often have similar end goals, they usually
forced some intelligence services to utilize the other have different methods of attaining said objectives;
two actors to maintain plausible deniability.
quasi-state actors have veiled intentions and their
purposes appear concealed. Incidents such as the
Non-State Actors
malware embedded at Creech AFB’s private servers
may be viewed as part of a nationalist agenda, yet
Due to the globalization of markets and the spread when footage of operational procedures of UAVs and
of corporatism, corporations have more commonly UCAVs appear on insurgents’ computers in Iraq, they
been utilizing spy agency and espionage tactics seem to have less of a strategic and more of a tactical
to gain a market advantage or as part of a broader purpose.186
national security initiative. Companies such as the
The “quasi-state actor” branding tends to
infamous 88 Queensway Group have holdings vital
184 Levkowitz, Lee, Marta McLellan Ross and J.R. Warner. “The 88 Queen-

182 “Pushing Ahead of the Cyberwarfare Pack.” Stratfor. 02 March 2009.
183 Goldberg, Jeffrey. “Let Space Shuttle Demise Awaken Gingrich Dream:
Goldberg.” Bloomberg. 23 April 2012. http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2012-04-23/let-the-shuttle-s-demise-awaken-gingrich-s-spacedreams.html, (accessed 23 April 2012).

sway Group: A Case Study in Chinese Investors’ Operations in Angola
and Beyond.”

185 Ibid.
186 Shactman, Noah. “Exclusive: Computer Virus Hits U.S. Drone Fleet.”

Wired. 07 October 2011. http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/
virus-hits-drone-fleet/, (accessed 23 April 2012).
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encompass a broad, overreaching category such
as terrorists, hackers, militias, and websites like
WikiLeaks. Yet they all share a broad advantage over
the rest of their counterparts: the United States has
publicly declared that cyber attacks and espionage
from foreign nations may be considered a declaration
of war; yet, the quasi-state actor is difficult to declare
war upon due to the difficulty of tracing origins in
addition to their use of proxy servers. Furthermore,
the deterrence strategy of “mutually assured
destruction” prevalent during the Cold War appears
to be ineffective against quasi-state actors who have
no concrete, physical location or allegiance to any
particular nationality. For quasi-state actors with
legitimate ties to a nationality or corporation, the
advantage would appear to be the plausible deniability
of their actions.
Espionage Economics and Democracy
The globalization of markets and cultures has
provided the corporate world with unparalleled
access to customers and sources of manufacture. Yet,
the diffusion of intellectual property in both civilian
and military spheres has given rise to foreign nations
acquiring technology that is crucial to American
culture and values. The development of these ideas is
to be accessible only in free and democratic societies
wherein people are challenged to think outside the
box and are rewarded for their creativity in doing so.
The steps to grow democracy and the free markets to
exploit the ingenuity are being skipped ahead of by
nation-states that lack the means to develop their own
creative potential. Rather than allowing the shifting of
power to citizens or giving them the ability to operate
in a heterogeneous society, nations are gaining the
after-effects without putting in the necessary time to
see those developments happen locally and naturally.
For those nations stealing ideas, the long-term
issue becomes that the emphasis is placed on reverseengineering and deconstruction of foreign ideas, be
it a physical product or a process, while it would be
better to invest their efforts in developing their own
ideas. Otherwise, host nations of technologies will

unveil newer technology before the reverse engineer
is complete. According to Willy Shih, a professor
at Harvard Business School, countries employing
espionage will need to develop their own research
and development process and mindset to succeed
their skills of copying others.187 He continued, noting
that “many countries go through an imitation phase,
but the real challenge is moving to an innovation
phase.”188 China and other countries are introducing
programs aimed at developing key deficiencies in
market or military competitiveness. Programs such as
the National High Technology Program (P863) target
key deficiencies in sectors crucial to China’s longterm competitiveness and national security. Those
goals sometimes include the clandestine acquisition
of American technologies.189
Conclusion
The concept of military size as the principle
means of power has been drastically altered in the
21st century. American assets for espionage are ever
increasing, as are the adversaries attempting to steal
them. Drastic reforms to electronic data transmission
will become battlegrounds for contentious debate in
the House and Senate. For America to continue to
assert its global power militarily and economically,
the corporate, civil, and military worlds will have
to cooperatively protect America’s largest assets: its
human capital and ingenuity. By securing these, the
United States can remain a stronghold for valuable
ideas and innovation of new ways to improve the
world as a whole, and the lives of those who live on it.

187 Riley, Michael A. and Ashlee Vance, “China Corporate Espionage Boom
Knocks Wind Out of U.S. Companies.”

188 Ibid.
189 “Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic
Secrets in Cyberspace.” ONCIX. 2011.
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The Strategic Intelligence Society is a campus club at Liberty University in Lynchburg,
Virginia. The purpose of the Strategic Intelligence Society is to prepare undergraduate students
for employment within the Intelligence Community by encouraging critical thinking that
leads to the analysis of current events: specifically, the ability to discern intelligence from
information within the fields of politics, technology, transnational issues, economics,
and military policy. This is accomplished by providing the students with a multitude of
opportunities, which include interactive sessions with guest speakers from various fields
within government, the intelligence community, and law enforcement, a variety of
intelligence-related extra-curricular opportunities, and various analytical publications. The
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University as well as selected articles from top student contributors concentrating on current
affairs pertaining to intelligence, law enforcement, and national security.
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